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Abstract
Social choice theory is a theoretical framework for analysis of combining individual
preferences, interests, or welfares to reach a collective decision or social welfare in some
sense. We introduce a new criterion for social choice protocols called ”social disappoint-
ment”. Social disappointment happens when the outcome of a voting system occurs for
those alternatives which are at the end of at least half of individual preference pro-
files. Here we introduce some protocols that prevent social disappointment and prove
an impossibility theorem based on this key concept.
1 Introduction
In social sciences, we are facing two kinds of social choices: voting which is used to make a
political decision and market mechanism as a tool to make an economic decision[1]. Here,
we are merely concerned with the former.
The theory underlying voting systems is known as social choice theory and is concerned
with the design and analysis of methods for collective decision making[27]. Voting pro-
cedures are among the most important methods for collective decision making. In this
paper, our attention is on voting procedures. Voting procedures focus on the aggregation
of individuals’ preferences to produce collective decisions. In practice, a voting procedure
is characterized by ballot responses and the way ballots are tallied to determine winners.
Voters are assumed to have clear preferences over candidates (alternatives) and attempt
to maximize satisfaction with the election outcome by their ballot responses. Voting pro-
cedures are formalized by social choice functions, which map ballot response profiles into
election outcomes(see[6], page:175).
We use a broad class of social choice functions such as Condorcet method, Plurality rule,
Hare system, Borda count, Sequential Pairwise Voting with a Fixed Agenda (Seq. Pairs),
and Dictatorship. Condorcet method is typically attributed to the Marquis de Condorcet
(1743-1794); However, it dates back to Ramon Llull in the thirteenth century([28] p. 6).
Hare procedure was introduced by Thomas Hare in 1861, and is also known by names
such as the ”single transferable vote system”(STV) or ”instant runoff voting” ([28] p. 7).
Jean Charles Chevalier de Borda (1733-99) in 1781 [5] introduced an aggregation procedure
known as Borda count. Interestingly, recent historical work by McLean, Urken (1993) [17],
and Pukelsheim (unpublished) reveals that Bordas system had been explicitly described in
1433 by Nicholas of Cusa (1401-64), a Renaissance scholar interested in the question of how
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German kings should be elected ([30] p. 9). For more details and examples, see [28] sec.
1.3.
There are five desirable properties that relate to such procedures: Always-A-Winner
Condition (AAW), Condorcet Winner Criterion (CWC), Pareto Condition, Monotonicity
(Mono), Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA). A social choice procedure is said to
satisfy AAWcondition if every sequence of individual preference lists produces at least one
winner. An alternative ’x’ is said to be a Condorcet winner if it is the unique winner in
Condorcets method. A social choice procedure is said to satisfy CWC provided that-if there
is a Condorcet winner-then it alone is the social choice. A social choice procedure is said to
satisfy the Pareto condition (or just Pareto) if the following holds for every pair ’x’ and ’y’
of alternatives: If everyone prefers ’x’ to ’y’, then y is not a social choice. A social choice
procedure is said to be monotone provided that the following holds for every alternative ’x’:
If ’x’ is the social choice (or tied for such) and someone changes his or her preference list by
moving ’x’ up one spot, then ’x’ should still be the social choice (or tied for such). A social
choice procedure has IIA condition the social choice set includes ’x’ but not ’y’, and one or
more voters change their preferences, but no one changes his or her mind about whether ’x’
is preferred to ’y’ or ’y’ to ’x’, then the social choice set should not change so as to include
’y’. The condition of ”independence of irrelevant alternatives” was first used by Arrow [1]
in 1951. For more details of these properties see [28], sec. 1.4.
In this paper, we propose a new property for social choice procedures called social
disappointment in voting which is a situation that happens when the winner is the least
favorable candidate for at least half of the voters. See the definition and an example of
social disappointment in section 2.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we introduce the concept
of social disappointment and the Least Public Resentment procedure (L.P.R) which is a
procedure that prevents social disappointment in voting. In section 3 in imitation of Tay-
lor’s work (see[29] also[28] pp. 28-31) we present an impossibility theorem based on social
disappointment in voting.
Notice: In this paper, we will follow the notation and basic results of Taylor and
Pacelli(see[28], chapter:1).
2 Social Disappointment
We start explaining the social disappointment property by the following example.
Example 2.1 Consider the following situation in which there are four Dutchmen, three
Germans, and two Frenchmen who have to decide which drink will be served for lunch (only
a single drink will be served to all).
4 3 2
Milk Beer Wine
Wine Wine Beer
Beer Milk Milk
Now, which drink should be served based on these individual preferences? Milk could be
chosen since it has the most agents ranking it first. Milk is the winner according to the
plurality rule, which only considers how often each alternative is ranked in first place. How-
ever, a majority of agents will be dissatisfied with this choice as they prefer any other drink
to Milk(see[7], pp. 3,4).
Definition 2.1 Social disappointment in voting happens when the outcome of a voting
system (for 3 or more alternatives) occurs for those alternatives which are at the end of at
least half of individual preference profiles.
Now the question is for which protocols social disappointment(S.D) may hap- pen? The
answer is given in the following table (where a ’yes’ indicates that social disappointment
may happen).
Plurality Borda Hare Seq. Pairs Dictator Condorcet
S.D Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
We prove the seven claims in Table 1.
Claim 2.1 The Plurality rule does not prevent social disappointment.
Proof. See Example 2.1. ⊣
Claim 2.2 The Borda count does not prevent social disappointment.
Proof. Consider the three alternatives ’a’, ’b’, and ’c’ and the following sequence of two
preference lists:
Voters Voters
1and2 3and4
a c
b b
c a
Alternatives ’a’, ’b’ and ’c’ are the social choice when the Borda count procedure is used.
Although ’a’ is the social choice (also ’c’), but it is at the bottom of individual preference
lists and so social disappointment has taken place. ⊣
Claim 2.3 The Hare procedure does not prevent social disappointment.
Proof. Consider the three alternatives ’a’, ’b’, and ’c’ and the following sequence of ten
preference lists grouped into voting blocks of size four, three, and two:
Voters Voters Voters
1-4 5-7 8-10
a c b
b b c
c a a
Alternative ’a’ is the social choice when the Hare system is used. Although ’a’ is the social
choice, but it is at the bottom of individual preference lists and so social disappointment
has taken place. ⊣
Claim 2.4 Sequential pairwise voting with a fixed agenda does not prevent social disap-
pointment.
Proof. Consider the three alternatives ’b’, ’c’, and a and suppose that this ordering of
the alternatives is also the agenda. Consider the following sequence of four preference lists
grouped into voting blocks of size two, one, and one:
Voters Voter Voter
1and2 3 4
a b c
b c b
c a a
Alternatives ’a’, ’b’ are the social choice when the Hare system is used. Although ’a’
is the social choice, but it is at the bottom of individual preference lists and so social
disappointment has taken place. ⊣
Claim 2.5 A dictatorship does not prevent social disappointment.
Proof. Consider the three alternatives ’a’, ’b’, and ’c’ and the following three preference
lists:
Voters Voter Voter
1and2 3 4
a c c
b b b
c a a
Assume that Voter 1 is the dictator. Then ’a’ is the social choice, but obviously social
disappointment has happened. ⊣
Claim 2.6 If in Condorcet method more than half of voters put ’a’ at the bottom of indi-
vidual preference lists then for sure ’a’ would not be the social choice and in this case social
disappointment would not occur. But if the number of voters is even and precisely half of
voters put ’a’ in the end of their lists, one of these two possibilities happens:
• 1. Not all voters in the other half put ’a’ at the top of their lists, which in this case,
’a’ definitely does not hold the social choice and social disappointment occures.
• 2. All the voters in the other half also put ’a’ at the top of their lists, which in this
case ’a’ is definitely in the set of social choice and therefore we face with the social
disappointment.
Proof. It is concluded from the definitions. ⊣
Remark 2.1 Regarding case 2 in claim 2.6 if we have only three alternatives, the set of
social choice certainly have more than one member.
2.1 The least public resentment procedure (L.P.R):
We observed that none of the famous procedures listed in Table 1 prevents social disap-
pointment. We introduce a procedure which prevents social disappointment in voting, called
The least public resentment procedure (L.P.R). In this procedure we begin by deleting the
alternative or alternatives occurring at bottom of the most lists. At this stage we have lists
that are at least one alternative shorter than the lists we started with. Now, we simply
repeat this procedure of deleting the least public resentment alternative or alternatives.
The alternative(s) deleted last is declared as the winner.
Example 2.2 Consider Example 2.1, we decide which alternative occurs at the bottom of
the most lists and delete it from all the lists. Milk is deleted from each list leaving the
following:
4 3 2
Wine Beer Wine
Beer Wine Beer
Now, Beer occurs at the bottom of six of the nine lists, and thus is eliminated. Hence, Wine
is the social choice when the L.P.R is used.
Which properties does this procedure satisfy? The answer is given in the following table:
AAW CWC Pareto Mono IIA Non S.D
L.P.R Yes No Yes No No Yes
Proposition 2.1 The L.P.R procedure satisfies AAW, Pareto, and nonexistence of social
disappointment (Non S.D) criterion but does not satisfy CWC, Monotonicity, and IIA.
Proof. For this procedure, the description makes it clear that there is at least one winner
for every profile. So L.P.R satisfies AAW condition.
Suppose that there is a winner that is in the end of at least half of preference profiles.
The L.P.R procedure would delete this alternative from profile lists in the first stage, so the
social disappointment for this alternative could not occure.
Consider the three alternatives ’a’, ’b’, and ’c’ and the following sequence of seven
preference lists grouped into voting blocks of size two, two, two, and one:
Voters Voters Voters Voter
1and2 3and4 5and6 7
a a b c
b c c b
c b a a
The L.P.R procedure produces ’b’ as the social choice. However, ’a’ is clearly the Condorcet
winner, defeating each of the other alternatives in one-on-one competitions. Since the
Condorcet winner is not the social choice in this situation, we have that the L.P.R procedure
does not satisfy the Condorcet winner criterion.
L.P.R procedure satisfies the Pareto condition. Because if in all lists ’b’ has occurred
down below ’a’, therefore at some point ’b’ would be gone but ’a’ stands still due to the
fact that ’b’ socially is more resentful than ’a’. So based on social choice procedure in this
system ’b’ would be eliminated in early stages or at most in comparison with ’a’.
Consider the three alternatives ’a’, ’b’, and ’c’ and the following sequence of seven
preference lists grouped into voting blocks of size two, two, two, and one:
Voters Voters Voter
1and2 3and4 5
b c b
a a c
c b a
We delete the alternatives which have taken place more than the other alternatives at the
end of the votes. In this case, that would be alternatives ’c’ and ’b’ with the two last places
in votes for each as compared to one for ’a’. But now ’a’ is the only alternative left, and so
it is the social choice when the L.P.R procedure is used.
Now suppose that the single voter on the most right changes his or her list by in-
terchanging ’a’ with the alternative that is right above ’a’ on this list. This apparently
favorable-to-’a’-change yields the following sequence of preference lists:
Voters Voters Voter
1and2 3and4 5
b c b
a a a
c b c
If we apply the L.P.R procedure again, we delete the alternatives which have taken place
more than the other alternatives at the end of the votes. In this case, ’c’ is that alternative.
But the reader can now easily check that with ’c’ so eliminated, alternative ’b’ is at bottom
of two of the fifth lists. Alternative ’a’ is deleted and so ’b’ is the social choice. This change
in social choice from ’a’ to ’c’ shows that the L.P.R procedure does not satisfy monotonicity.
Consider the three alternatives ’a’, ’b’, and ’c’ and the following sequence of four pref-
erence lists grouped into voting blocks of size one, one, and two:
Voter Voter Voters
1 2 3and4
b a b
a c c
c b a
Alternative ’b’ is the social choice when the L.P.R procedure is used. In particular, ’b’
is a winner and ’a’ is a non-winner. Now suppose that Voter 4 changes his or her list by
interchanging the alternatives ’a’ and ’c’. The lists then become:
Voter1 Voter2 Voter3 Voter4
b a b b
a c c a
c b a c
Notice that we still have ’b’ over ’a’ in Voter 4s list. However, L.P.R procedure now has
’a’ and ’b’ tied for the win. Thus, although no one changed his or her mind about whether
’a’ is preferred to ’b’ or ’b’ to ’a’, the alternative ’a’ went from being a non-winner to
being a winner. This shows that independence of irrelevant alternatives fails for the L.P.R
procedure. ⊣
3 A Glimpse of Impossibility
Taylor proved in [29] also [28] pp. 28-31 that there is no social choice procedure for three
or more alternatives that satisfies the always-a-winner criterion, independence of irrelevant
alternatives, and the Condorcet winner criterion. Now we prove an impossibility theorem
based on social disappointment concept.
Theorem 3.1 There is no social choice procedure for four or more alternatives that satisfies
the nonexistence of S.D. criterion, and the Condorcet winner criterion.
Proof. We assume that we have a social choice procedure that satisfies the Condorcet
winner criterion. We then show that if this procedure is applied to the profile that consists
of Condorcets voting paradox [10], then it produces a winner which will lead to social
disappointment. We prove this claim for when we have four alternatives.
Assume that we have a social choice procedure that satisfies the Condorcet winner
criterion. Consider the following profile:
d d d c b b
a a c a c c
b b a b a a
c c b d d d
Alternative ’d’ is the unique social choice when the Condorcets method is used. Although
’d’ is the social choice, but it is at the bottom of individual preference lists and so social
disappointment has taken place. ⊣
Corollary 3.1 There is no social choice procedure for four or more alternatives that sat-
isfies:
• a) the nonexistence of S.D. criterion, always a winner, and the Condorcet winner
criterion.
• b) the nonexistence of S.D. criterion, monotonicity, and the Condorcet winner crite-
rion.
• c) the nonexistence of S.D. criterion, Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives, and the
Condorcet winner criterion.
• d) the nonexistence of S.D. criterion, Pareto, and the Condorcet winner criterion.
Proof. It is obvious considering Theorem 3.1. ⊣
3.1 Condorcet with an amendment and Seq. Pairs with an amendment
procedure
Before considering the rest of the possible cases, we introduce following two procedures and
investigate their properties which we mentioned in this article.
Condorcet with an amendment procedure
This protocol is done the same as Condorcets method, with the difference that in the end
we remove those alternatives with the social disappointment from the set of social choice.
Seq. Pairs with an amendment procedure
This protocol is done the same as Seq. Pairs, with the difference that in the end we remove
those alternatives with the social disappointment from the set of social choice.
Which properties do the procedures satisfy? The answer is given in the following table:
AAW CWC Pareto Mono IIA Non S.D
Condorcet with an amendment No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Seq. Pairs with an amendment Yes No Yes Yes No Yes
Here we will only prove three items of the table above. We leave the rest for the reader
(The proof will be easy to comprehend according to the given definitions and [28] sections
1.5,1.6 ).
Proposition 3.1 Condorcet with an amendment and Seq. Pairs with an amendment pro-
cedures do not satisfy the Condorcet winner criterion. Furthermore Condorcet with an
amendment procedure does not satisfy the always a winner criterion.
Proof. Consider the following profile:
d d d c b b
a a c a c c
b b a b a a
c c b d d d
Alternative ’d’ is the unique social choice when the Condorcets method is used. There-
fore there is no winner (NW) when the Condorcet with an amendment procedure is used.
Consider Seq. Pairs voting with fixed agenda a,b,c,d. Alternatives ’c’, ’d’ are the social
choices when the Seq. Pairs voting with this particular fixed agenda is used. Thus alterna-
tive ’c’ is the social choice when Seq. Pairs with an amendment is used, so Condorcet with
an amendment and Seq. Pairs with an amendment procedures do not satisfy the Condorcet
winner criterion. Furthermore according to what was said Condorcet with an amendment
procedure does not satisfy the always a winner criterion.
⊣
Remark 3.1 In light of Remark 2.1 we understand that set of social choice would be either
all three alternatives or two alternatives which one would be free from social disappointment.
Anyway, set of social choice would include the alternative with no social disappointment.
Considering this fact the following proposition will be prove.
Proposition 3.2 There exist some social choice procedures for three alternatives that sat-
isfy:
• a) the nonexistence of S.D. criterion, and the Condorcet winner criterion.
• b) the nonexistence of S.D. criterion, the Condorcet winner, and always a winner
criterion.
• c) the nonexistence of S.D. criterion, the Condorcet winner, and Pareto criterion.
• d) the nonexistence of S.D. criterion, the Condorcet winner, and monotonicity crite-
rion.
• e) the nonexistence of S.D. criterion, the Condorcet winner, and independence of
irrelevant alternatives criterion.
• f) the Pareto criterion, the Condorcet winner, and independence of irrelevant alter-
natives criterion.
• g) the nonexistence of S.D. criterion, monotonicity, and independence of irrelevant
alternatives criterion.
Proof. For (b) consider Seq. Pairs with an amendment and for the rest Condorcet’s method
with an amendment. ⊣
3.2 The Least Unpopular (L.U) and The Least Unpopular Reselection
procedure(L.U.R)
To investigate the remaining cases we introduce and investigate The Least Unpopular and
The Least Unpopular Reselection procedures.
The Least Unpopular procedure (L.U)
The social choice in this procedure is (are) the alternative(s) that appears lesser than the
others at the bottom of individual preference lists. This protocol satisfies AAW, monotonic-
ity, and nonexistence of S.D. criterion, but does not satisfy CWC, Pareto, and IIA criterion.
Proposition 3.3 The Least Unpopular procedure does not satisfy CWC, IIA, and Pareto
criterion.
Proof. Consider the four alternatives ’a’, ’b’, ’c’, and ’d’ and the following profile:
Voters Voter Voter
1and2 3 4
a c d
b a a
c b b
d d c
Alternatives ’a’, ’b’ are the social choices when the Least Unpopular procedure is used.
Thus, alternative ’b’ is in the set of social choice even though everyone prefers ’a’ to ’b’.
This show that Pareto fails. Now consider the three alternatives ’a’, ’b’, ’c’ and following
profile:
Voters Voter
1and2 3
a b
b c
c a
Alternative ’b’ is the social choice when the Least Unpopular procedure is used. However,
’a’ is clearly the Condorcet winner, defeating each of the other alternatives in one-on-one
competitions. Since the Condorcet winner is not the social choice in this situation, we have
that the Least Unpopular procedure does not satisfy the Condorcet winner criterion. On
the other hand ’b’ is a non-winner. Now suppose that voter 3 changes his or her list by
interchanging the alternatives ’a’ and ’c’. The lists then become:
Voters Voter
1and2 3
a b
b a
c c
Notice that we still have ’b’ over ’a’ in Voter 4s list. However, Least Unpopular procedure
now has ’a’ and ’b’ tied for the win. Thus, although no one changed his or her mind about
whether ’a’ is preferred to ’b’ or ’b’ to ’a’, the alternative ’a’ went from being a non-winner
to being a winner. This shows that independence of irrelevant alternatives fails for the
Least Unpopular procedure. ⊣
Proposition 3.4 There are some social choice procedures for three or more alternatives
that satisfy:
a) the nonexistence of S.D. criterion, monotonicity, and always a winner criterion.
b) the nonexistence of S.D. criterion, Pareto, and always a winner criterion.
Proof. The Least Unpopular procedure is one of them. ⊣ Now we introduce and investigate
The Least Unpopular Reselection procedure.
The Least Unpopular Reselection (L.U.R)
First of all we choose a set of alternatives appearing lesser than the others at the bottom of
individual preference lists. If this set has only one member, it would be the social choice.
Otherwise we remove the remaining alternatives and run the L.U. procedure for the set
obtained from the first stage, and keep doing this until there will be no continuing. The
obtained set in the last repetition would be the social choice. This protocol satisfies AAW,
monotonicity, Pareto, and nonexistence of S.D. criterion, but does not satisfy CWC, and
IIA criterion.
Proposition 3.5 The Least Unpopular Reselection procedure does not satisfy CWC and
IIA criterion.
Proof. Perform as we did in the proof of Proposition 3.3. ⊣
Proposition 3.6 There are some social choice procedures for three or more alternatives
that satisfy the nonexistence of S.D. criterion, Pareto, and monotonicity criterion.
Proof. The L.U.R procedure is one of them. ⊣
4 Conclusion and Future Direction
Here in the following table we summarize what we came to conclusion in the previous
sections:
AAW CWC Pareto Mono IIA Non S.D
Condorcet no yes yes yes yes no
Plurality yes no yes yes no no
Borda count yes no yes yes no no
Hare system yes no yes no no no
Seq. Pairs yes no no yes no no
Dictator yes no yes yes no no
L.P.R yes no yes yes no yes
Condorcet with an amendment no no yes yes yes yes
Seq. Pairs with an amendment yes no yes yes no yes
L.U yes no no yes no yes
L.U.R yes no yes yes no yes
Finally we must note that the well-known procedures that satisfy the condition IIA are
Condorcet extension which means that they choose the Condorcet winner whenever one
exists. Since CWC is not compatible with the nonexistence of S.D. criterion, we dont
know whether there are some social choice procedures for three alternatives that satisfy the
nonexistence of S.D. criterion, always a winner criterion, and independence of irrelevant
alternatives criterion.
This question can be a motivation for future work.
History and Related Works
Kenneth Arrow showed that it is impossible to design a voting rule that satisfies some very
natural properties (Arrow, 1950)[2]. This seminal work is thus named Arrows impossibility
theorem, and is broadly regarded as the beginning of modern Social Choice Theory, which
is an active research direction in Economics[32].
In terms of the literature, there are, as one might expect, an abundance of treatments
of Arrows theorem. Two of the most notable book-length treatments are Arrow (1963)[2]
and Kelly (1978)[14]. Textbook coverage (with proofs) is also widely available, including
chapters in Kelly (1987)[15], Saari (1995)[21], and Taylor(1995)[28].
The 1970s seem to have been the heyday for social choice research in the second half
of the twentieth century. For references, Kelly (1991)[16] is remarkable. Books on social
choice (from a number of different perspectives) include Sen (1970)[24], Fishburn (1973)[13],
Feldman (1980)[11], Riker (1982)[19], Schofield (1985)[23], Campbell (1992)[8], Shepsle and
Bonchek (1997)[25], Austen-Smith and Banks (2000)[3], and Arrow, Sen, and Suzumura,
(2002)[4]. Books on different aspects of voting include Straffin (1980)[26], Nurmi (1987)[18],
Saari (1994)[20], Felsenthal and Machover (1998)[12], Taylor and Zwicker (1999)[31], and
Saari (2001)[22]. An important recent survey is Brams and Fishburn (2002)[6](see[28], pp.
19,20).
Originating in economics and political science, social choice theory has since found its
place as one of the fundamental tools for the study of multi-agent systems. The reasons for
this development are clear: if we view a multi-agent system as a society of autonomous soft-
ware agents, each of which has different objectives, is endowed with different capabilities,
and possesses different information, then we require clearly defined and well-understood
mechanisms for aggregating their views so as to be able to make collective decisions in
such a multi-agent system(see[7], page:3). In fact, a burgeoning areaComputational So-
cial Choiceaims to address problems in computational aspects of information/preference
representation and aggregation in multi-agent scenarios(see[32],[9]and[7]).
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